4. The Self-Trapped Japanese Economy – An Overview by Hirai, Toshiaki
Chapter 4
The Self-Trapped Japanese Economy –
An Overview
Toshiaki Hirai
_______________________________________
1. Introduction
In the 1990s Japan, as the most successful nation for economic 
performance, was struck with awe and consternation. While through-
out the 1980s the US, UK and the European countries suffered from 
stagflation, Japan maintained high economic performance. Thus 
much attention was paid to the clue to the success of the Japanese 
economy, and the “Industrial Policy” by the MITI (Ministry of Inter-
national Trade and Industry) and the “Japanese Way of Doing Busi-
ness” were lionized.
In the late 80s there emerged great cracks in the Socialist Bloc 
which played its part in the Cold War System. In Eastern Europe the 
civil rights movement became increasingly active, in its efforts to 
shake off the yoke of the Soviet Union and introduce some sort of 
capitalistic system, Poland taking the leading role. The Soviet Union, 
no longer having the power to crush the movement, finally fell in 
1991.
Since then twenty years have passed, and here we are in 2011. 
During this period the world has gone through great transformation 
and turbulence. The US achieved some economic growth thanks to 
the information technology revolution and financial globalization, 
while the UK enjoyed some growth due to financial globalization. 
More strikingly, what came as truly unexpected and surprising was 
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the miraculous economic growth of China, India and Brazil, which 
have come to exert some influence over the world economy. 
Japan, on the other hand, was left out in the cold: it tumbled by 
itself and remained stagnant – hence the so-called “Lost Decade” (or 
the “Lost Two Decades”). 
It became a constant refrain to speak of Japan as the country 
which could still find no way out of the stagnation, or the one that 
held a lesson for all. Emblematic was Obama’s statement in the Pres-
idential Inaugural Speech two years ago that he would implement 
any resolute policy for recovery of the US economy from the crisis, 
referring to the Lost Decade. 
The present paper will look into the realities of the Lost Dec-
ade, examining the path along which the Japanese economy proceed-
ed over the three decades.
2. The Misstep from the Supreme Reign
2.1. The Plaza Accord (1985)
In the 1970s the world economy saw the collapse of the Bret-
ton Woods System and the advent of the flexible exchange rate sys-
tem as a new currency system. 
After the yen was fixed at 1 dollar = 308 yen at the Smithson-
ian Agreement (December 1971), Japan eventually came to adopt a 
flexible exchange rate system in February 1973. Immediately after 
that, the yen appreciated to 1 dollar = 260 yen, but remained stable at 
around 300 yen thereafter. Then a rapid appreciation of the yen  oc-
curred as from October 1977, arriving at 175 yen in October 1979.
Besides the change in the monetary system, the world econo-
my also saw US-Japan trade conflict.
The Japanese firms, producing high-quality goods thanks to 
sophisticated technology, had rapidly expanded sales abroad and 
come to dominate the world market. In consequence Japan’s balance 
of trade continued to show a surplus, and so it was that trade conflict 
arose with the US. As huge exports to the US drove American firms 
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to bankruptcy, the US began to criticize Japan in terms of unfair 
trade. This US-Japan trade conflict was to continue over the long pe-
riod, starting with synthetic fiber, followed by steel products, color 
TV and cars. Japan usually responded to the US with self-imposed 
restraint. Its balance of trade surplus, however, rapidly increased 
from 1983 on, and US grievance waxed ever stronger. 
At that time the US economy was suffering from stagflation. 
Volcker, who became the Fed chairperson in August 1979, imple-
mented tight monetary policy (“New Adjustment Finance Method”), 
causing the FF rate to rise to 20 % (“Volcker Shock”). In conse-
quence, although the price level rapidly stabilized, the unemploy-
ment rate rose further, reaching 11%. Due to the high rate of interest, 
huge amounts of dollars poured into the US, which caused consider-
able appreciation of the dollar (from 200 yen in October 1981 to 275 
yen in October 1983). The exchange rate then settled at around 250 
yen, which meant some depreciation of the yen, resulting in a rapid 
increase in the balance of trade surplus. The balance of trade in rela-
tion to the US also showed a huge surplus, which heightened the 
trade conflict.
It was in these circumstances that the “Plaza Accord” (Sep-
tember 1985) was concluded with strong initiative on the part of the 
US Administration. This was a pact among the G5 for cooperative 
intervention in the foreign exchange market. Its aim was, in essence, 
to appreciate the yen (depreciate the dollar) by selling dollars and 
buying yen.
In consequence, the exchange rate rose from 1 dollar=255 yen 
in October 1985 to 150 yen in October 1987. Thereafter the yen went 
on appreciating until it reached 125 yen in October 1988. Then it 
went on to depreciate for a while, and again appreciated until it 
reached 79 yen in April 1995.
In spite of this appreciation, Japan’s balance of trade saw a 
large surplus persisting throughout the 90s.
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2.2. The Bubble Period
Speaking of the recent bubble economy we may mention the 
real estate bubbles of the US, Ireland and Spain in the early 2000s. 
We can also mention the real estate bubble in Japan, which anticipat-
ed them. It continued from December 1986 to February 1991, and its 
collapse continued from the spring of 1991 to that of 1993.
2.2.1. The Upward Phase (December 1986 - February 1991)
Worries about Depression Induced by Yen Appreciation – As Japan’s 
economic growth had been led by exports, worries spread that the 
steep yen appreciation due to the Plaza Accord might cause serious 
depression if the government did nothing. The surplus, in fact, con-
tinued to decrease in the balance of trade from 1987 to 1990.
The Nakasone Cabinet then implemented fiscal and monetary 
policies aiming at stimulating domestic demand. For fiscal policy it 
put forward the “Emergency Economic Measures” (May 1987) while 
for monetary policy it lowered the official discount rate to 2.5 % 
(February 1987 - May 1989). In consequence, public investment as 
well as private investment increased tremendously. Besides, the na-
tion-wide project to develop the resort area was devised as a means 
to stimulate domestic demand (“The Resort Act”, 1987).
The Japanese exporting firms adopted two methods to tackle 
the yen appreciation. One was to reduce production cost through a 
rise in labor productivity. The use of robots in the production process 
was emblematic of this approach, which amazed the world.
Another method was to transfer production bases abroad for 
cheaper labor cost. This was extensively carried out, to such a degree 
that it might have induced) de-industrialization. The ratio of produc-
tion abroad to total production in the manufacturing sector, in fact, 
soared from 3.0 % in 1985 to 6.4 % in 1990 (the main location was 
South Eastern Asia1
                                                          
1 This was a key factor for Southeastern Asia’s dramatic economic 
development thereafter.
).
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And yet Japan’s balance of trade showed a healthy surplus, al-
beit continuously decreasing until 1991. Japan did not see worrisome 
depression, but maintained the boom thanks to the fiscal and mone-
tary policies. 
The Abode of Demons: The Change in the Financial Structure – Un-
der these circumstances, the scene was set for major policy failures –
a shift from indirect finance to direct finance (or self-finance) in the 
Japanese financial structure. As a result of a steep increase in ex-
ports, many firms emerged in possession of huge sums of money (the 
phrase, “Toyota Bank” was emblematic), and felt less need to depend 
on the banking institution for procurement of capital.
On top of that, the stock market was gaining in popularity, giv-
ing rise to a situation that made it easy for firms to procure capital 
through it. The stock price continued to go up, with the Nikkei Aver-
age Stock Price rising from 1,300 yen in 1986 to 38,900 yen in 1989. 
Around that time a social atmosphere emerged in which more and 
more housewives caught the bug of investing their money in equities 
and other financial assets (the so-called “Zai-Tech Boom”).
This state of affairs had serious implication for the banks. So 
far the Japanese economy had continued along a high economic 
growth rate, and firms were eager to procure a vast amount of capi-
tal. As long as the stock market was underdeveloped2
Then, due to a large-scale shift to direct finance and self-
finance, this traditional method no longer served the purpose. In ad-
dition, due to the huge surplus in the balance of trade the foreign ex-
change reserves rose abruptly, which brought the money supply rap-
, firms had no 
means of procuring capital other than borrowing it from the banks. 
People deposited a large proportion of their increased incomes in the 
banks (or post-offices), and yet this was not sufficient to meet the 
demand of the firms. As, moreover, the loan rate was fixed above the 
deposit rate, the banks were able to finance capital safely by means 
of rationing.
                                                          
2 It should be noted that this was not the case in the prewar period.
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idly flowing into the banks. Thus the banks found themselves in a 
new situation, forced to look for new customers.
Thus the banks came to expand their business, including mort-
gage loans, stock loans, and free loans (usable for any purpose). In-
dividuals and firms able to obtain loans purchased immobile proper-
ties, stocks and other financial assets.
As the property prices and stock prices started to soar, more 
and more people were eager to get loans, believing that the prices 
would rise instantaneously. When the prices promptly rose, the de-
mand for loans increased yet further, which in turn drove property 
prices and stock prices up still further.  
Gradually the people making transactions for the sake of pure 
speculation, carried away by get-rich-quick dreams, came to account 
for a large weight in the markets. In consequence, eventually the land 
value within the Yamanote Line reportedly came equal to the land 
value of the whole of the USA. The objects of the speculatively bor-
rowed money were not confined to properties and stocks, but extend-
ed to golf club membership cards, valuable paintings, and even fancy 
foreign cars. And in fact the prices of these items continued to rock-
et.
These speculative activities seriously affected the manufactur-
ing industry. Many manufacturing firms came to be devoted to spec-
ulation to such a degree that they almost forgot their primary busi-
ness. There were firms which even boasted larger profits in “Zai-
Tech” than profits in the primary business.
The speculative activities extended beyond the domestic to the 
world market. Speculative investment in properties, stocks, other fi-
nancial assets, and artworks3 increased at a faster pace. The purchase 
of the Rockefeller Center by the Mitsubishi Estate in 1989 was an 
emblematic case of such dealing.
                                                          
3 Successful bidding by Japanese in auctions such as Sotheby’s became all 
the news.
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2.2.2. The Burst (February 1991- March 1993)
As the price of immobile property went up, the unlawful activ-
ity in connection with it (i.e. “Jiage”) became a major social prob-
lem. On top of it, unlawful loans by financial institutions (e.g., coun-
terfeiting of the deposit account by bankers) came to light. Scathing 
criticisms was then voiced by the mass media and the public on 
property speculation and the loan stance adopted by the banks.
In response, the Treasury embarked on “the Regulation of the 
Total Sum concerning the Property Loan” (March 1990). This was 
an administrative directive designed to hold the rate of growth of the 
property loan below that of the total loan. In practice it acted as a 
tremendous pinprick, bursting the bubble.
It was, rather, the stock market which was initially affected. 
The Nikkei Average Stock Price, which was record-high at 38,000 
yen in December 1989, plunged to 15,000 yen in 1992. Then the 
price of property, which had only seen a decline in the rate of in-
crease even in 1991, dropped sharply. Many firms and individuals 
engaging in speculative activities were suddenly refused loans by the 
banks. They were forced to rush to sell their properties and equities, 
which caused further decline in the price of the stock and the proper-
ties. And the bubble burst there. 
This, in turn, worsened the balance sheets of the banks and se-
curity companies which had made loans to these firms and individu-
als. It turned out to be difficult to retrieve loaned money, for more 
and more firms and individuals were pushed into default, and the 
value of the collateral possessed by the financial institutions plunged. 
In a word, the loaned money turned into bad debts. 
The banks, which initially held the optimistic view that prop-
erty value as well as the stock price would soon rise, tried to prevent 
the bad assets from coming to the surface. This they were able to do 
under the system of acquisition cost basis accounting, unless the bad 
assets were disposed of. However, this behavior was soon to be de-
nounced by the mass media as “bad asset concealment”.   
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3. Recovery, Stagnation, and Recovery
When the bubble economy turned into depression, what kind 
of economic measures would the government implement? The 
phrase, “the Lost Decade” is quite often used to characterize the Jap-
anese economy in this period. However, it is not true to say that all 
were doomed to failure from the start, for there was a period in 
which policy was seen to have some effect. It is premature to label it 
with the blanket term “the Lost Decade”. Let us take the period in 
order.  
3.1. Economic Stimulus Measures and Economic Recovery (1993-
1996)
While property value and stock price were abruptly deteriorat-
ing, the government implemented the following economic stimulus 
measures, which had fiscal policy to boost effective demand as top 
priority.
(1) “The Overall Economic Measures” (August 1992. 10.7 trillion 
yen) by the Miyazawa Cabinet (November 1991 – August 1993).
(2) “On the Promotion of the Overall Economic Measures” (April 
1993. 13.2 trillion yen) by the Miyazawa Cabinet.
(3) “Emergent Economic Measures” (September 1993. 6 trillion yen) 
by the Hosokawa Cabinet (August 1993 – April 1994). 
(4) “The Overall Economic Measures” (February 1994. 15.25 trillion 
yen) by the Hosokawa Cabinet.
(5) “Economic Measures” (September 1995. 14.22 trillion yen) by 
the Murayama Cabinet (June 1994 – August 1995) together with 
a lowering of the official discount rate to 0.5 %.
Thanks to these measures, personal consumption and capital 
investment increased. The Japanese economy was able to accomplish 
an economic growth rate of 3.1 % in 1995 (as compared with the 
previous year), and 4.7% in 1996, and fear over the bad debt de-
creased. Fiscal policy was clearly having effect around this period.
Globalization and Economic Crisis
 
83
3.2. Fiscal Structural Reform and the Financial Crisis (1996-1998)
Seeing the economically favorable situation, the Hashimoto 
Cabinet (January 1996 - July 1998) set its primary policy objective 
on fiscal structural reform. The cabinet raised the consumption tax 
by 2%, abolished the special tax break (2 trillion yen), and increased 
the burden on the public through health service reform (2 trillion 
yen), expecting to increase tax revenue by the total sum of 9 trillion 
yen.
Contrary to the expectation, however, the economy, which had 
been showing an upward trend, was to plunge again with this policy. 
In 1997 the stock price sharply dropped and the bad debt problem 
came to the surface. At the G10 summit in July 1998, moreover, it 
was decided that an international bank should maintain 8 % plus as 
the capital-to-asset ratio (the BIS regulation). The banks concerned 
carried out extensive credit crunch and credit withdrawal.
Thus the Japanese economy again deteriorated and, additional-
ly, fell prey to financial crisis (the following bankruptcies occurred 
in succession: the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and the Yamaichi Se-
curity Company [November 1997]; the Long-Term Credit Bank of 
Japan [October 1998]; the Nippon Credit Bank [December 1998]4.
Asset prices slumped while the number of bankrupt firms and indi-
viduals soared, which, in turn, worsened the balance sheet of the fi-
nancial institutions.5
                                                          
4 Ironically, it was in November that the “Fiscal Structural Reform Act” was 
enacted.
The value of the bad debts possessed by the 
5 The Housing Loan Companies (“Jusen”) Problem became a hot issue in 
relation to property. They were subsidiaries for making loans to the property 
set up by the financial institutions. Even when “the Regulation of the Total 
Sum concerning the Property Loan” was implemented, money flew, through 
a loophole, into the Jusen from the financial institutions managed by the 
Agricultural Cooperation. The Jusen continued to make loans for property. 
However, this came to aggravate further the balance sheets of these finan-
cial institutions under the overall asset deflation. 
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banks, which amounted to 40 trillion yen in August 1995, jumped to 
79 trillion yen in December 1997.
The Hashimoto Cabinet, which faced a serious depression, 
suspended the fiscal structural reform and implemented the “Overall 
Economic Measures” (16.7 trillion yen) in April 1998. However, the 
effect was not favorable. This should not be attributed to the fiscal 
policy, but rather to the fiscal structural reform, which is, by its very 
nature, a deflationary policy. The rate of economic growth in 1997 
was 0.2 %, and -0.6 % in 1998.
The megabanks, which suffered from a steady decline in asset 
prices, finally appealed to the government for public funding. In con-
sequence, the following bailouts were made: (i) (February 1998) 18 
trillion yen for the 21 large banks including the Long-Term Credit 
Bank of Japan and the Nippon Credit Bank; (ii) (March 1999) 7.5 
trillion yen for the 15 large banks6
Through the 90s, spending went to the tune of 18.6 trillion yen 
for the bankrupt financial institutions, 9.6 trillion yen to buy up the 
assets from the financial institutions, and 12.3 trillion yen for capital 
infusion into the almost bankrupt financial institutions
The mass media and public opin-
ion denounced this as a continuation of the so-called “Convoy Sys-
tem”.
7.
The Line of Financial Liberalization - The collapse of the financial 
system in the latter half of the 90s constituted for the government a 
considerable inducement to leave the traditional “Convoy 
tem”8
The plan was composed of two pillars. One pillar was the lib-
eralization of securities, finance, and insurance.
and promote financial liberalization (the “Japan-Version of the 
Big Bang”). This was carried out mainly by the Hashimoto Cabinet.
                                                          
6 The road to public funding for banks was paved by the “Early Promotion 
of the Financial Function Act” (October 1998).
7 It is a historical irony that similar things were to be carried out on a larger 
scale throughout the world after the Lehman Shock.
8 Another factor is pressure exerted by the US.
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In November 1996 the Hashimoto Cabinet put forward an idea 
for the financial system reform, advocating “the three principles” 
(Freedom, Fairness and Globalization). The idea was implemented as 
the “Financial System Reform Act” (June 1998), which advocated: 
(i) deregulation of brokerage commissions; (ii) promotion of new en-
try into the banking sector, the security sector, and the insurance sec-
tor; (iii) shakedown of the investment trust; (iv) complete lifting of 
the ban on OTC (Over-the-Counter) derivatives; (v) enhancement of 
disclosure; (vi) upgrading of the rule of transaction. 
This movement was closely tied to the financial liberalization 
carried out in the US, where the Glass-Steagall Act (1933) was muti-
lated and eventually taken over by the Gramm-Leach-Briley Act 
(1999). The US strongly urged Japan to adopt the same approach.
Another pillar was overhaul of the bureaucratic machinery. In 
June 1998 the Hashimoto Cabinet separated the Bureau of Check and 
Oversight from the Treasury in accordance with the “policy of sepa-
rating fiscal matter from monetary matter”, and set up the “Financial 
Supervisory Agency”. In July 2000, moreover, the Mori Cabinet 
founded the “Financial Services Agency”, integrating the Financial 
Supervisory Agency with the Financial Planning Bureau of the 
Treasury. It is worth stressing that this reorganization brought about 
a weakening of the Treasury, which had so far flaunted absolute 
powers.
3.3. Economic Measures and the Economic Recovery (1998 –2000)
The Obuchi Cabinet (1998–2000), which was established in 
July 1998, when the Japanese economy spiraled downward and the 
financial system was in crisis, advocated recovery of the economy as 
top priority: (i) for fiscal policy, the “Emergent Economic Measures” 
(November 1998. 23.9 trillion yen) and the “Economic Renovation 
Measures” (November 1999); (ii) for monetary policy, the zero inter-
est rate policy (February 1999). Thanks to these policies the Japanese 
economy clearly showed some recovery (November 2000).
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Then the Bank of Japan lifted the zero interest rate policy 
(August 2000) although the Obuchi Cabinet opposed it. At that point 
the so-called “Dot Com Bubble” burst in the US, and the Japanese 
economy again showed a downward turn due to the decline in ex-
ports. The Bank of Japan again implemented the zero interest  rate 
policy (together with the Quantitative Easing policy, March 2001. 
This was maintained until July 2006).
As compared with the fiscal policy, however, just how much 
the monetary policy helped in alleviating the economy is doubtful 
(see Table 3).
According to this table, the monetary base (the account current 
balance of the banks on the BOJ) showed a big increase in 2001 and 
2002, while the rate of increase in money supply (the deposit balance 
of individuals and firms on the banks) was incredibly low. At that 
time the credit crunch held sway and the financial institutions were 
not inclined to make loans to the real economy. Rather, their usual 
practice was to purchase the national debt with the money obtaina-
ble.
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(Table 1?Monetary Base and Money Supply (% compared with the Aver-
age Balance of the previous year?
Monetary Base Money Supply
97 8.2 3.5
98 7.4 3.7
99 9.8 3.2
00 3.8 2.2
01 14.7 3.1
02 21.8 3.2
(Source) BOJ Data 
3.4?The Structural Reform and the “Izanami” Boom
It is the Structural Reform and the “Izanami Boom” (February 
2002–October 2007) that characterized the Koizumi Cabinet era.
The Structural Reform was an inheritance of the Hashimoto 
Cabinet as well as representing explicit approval of “Market Funda-
mentalism” (or the Washington Consensus). The Koizumu Cabinet, 
which advocated small government and a balanced budget, persisted 
in a deflationary policy.
The zero interest rate policy by the BOJ attracted US investors 
who borrowed yen and exchanged them for dollars, which were car-
ried over to the US and used for consumption and investment (the 
“Yen Carry Trade”). This in turn further boosted the US economy, 
which had already shown an upward trend. The Yen Carry Trade 
brought about a depreciation in yen, which induced a rapid increase 
in exports, due to which the Japanese economy was able to get on a 
modestly upward curve.
This situation continued from February 2002 to October 2007. 
Due to its considerable duration it was dubbed the “Izanami Boom”, 
contrasting it with the “Izanagi Boom” (November 1965 – July 
1970). However, this boom’s beneficiaries were confined to the ex-
porting firms and the financial institutions. At the same time restruc-
turing proceeded in the whole industry; a great deal of labor em-
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ployment was shifted onto a temporary basis; the level of income 
remained stagnant, and income disparity widened. Thus the general 
public had limited awareness of the actuality and benefits of the 
boom. And economic growth in this period was, in fact, very modest. 
No wonder it is also dubbed the “Kagerou (or Air Turbulence) 
Boom”. 
3.4.1. The Structural Reform
The Koizumi Cabinet took a critical stance on the counter-
cyclical measures and placed major emphasis on the structural re-
form, for which the Cabinet put forward the following: (i) privatiza-
tion of the Postal Services, which was the main point of dispute in 
the general election in September 2005; (ii) privatization of the 
Highway Public Corporation; (iii) the Structural Special Zone; (iii) 
the Divine Trinity Reform; (iv) reorganization of the bureaucratic 
machinery.
It is doubtful, however, to what degree these reforms (some of 
which were not implemented) effectively contributed to revitalizing 
the Japanese economy. Many reforms were watered down and privat-
ization was no more than a nominal change. Albeit the bureaucratic 
machinery was vertiginously overhauled, restructuring of public offi-
cials was not touched on at all. Although the Koizumi Cabinet em-
phasized the private economy (the market economy) and the reduc-
tion of activities by the state, the administrative reform dwindled into 
all bark and no bite.
The structural reform by Mr. Koizumi was carried out with the 
support of the general public. Although he was a maverick, he had a 
flair for populism which was unique in the Japanese political scene. 
When the mass media failed to show interest in a given reform, that 
structural reform plan came to an end without any substantial change 
as a result of power struggles behind the scenes. Then another plan 
for structural reform was put forward to attract the general public.
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3.4.2. The “Izanami Boom” (February 2002 – October 2007)
Cavalcade of Deflationary Policy ? To repeat, the Koizumi 
Cabinet took a critical stance on the counter-cyclical measures. It 
implemented, in fact, a series of deflationary policies as follows: (i) a 
hike in the consumption tax rate; (ii) the abolition of income tax 
credit; (iii) an increase in health insurance premium; (iv) extension of 
retirement age.
They were founded on a microscopic (or microeconomic) idea 
of normalization (or equilibrium) of each account: (i) in order to 
solve the budget deficit, a hike in the consumption tax rate, and the 
abolition of income tax credit were advocated; (ii) in order to deal 
with the medical insurance fund deficit, an increase in the health in-
surance premium was advocated; (iii) to tackle the national pension 
fund deficit, extension of retirement age was advocated.
Of these, the medical insurance issue and the national pension 
problems are closely related to the aging problem facing Japan, so 
this is a very serious problem to tackle by any means. However, the 
reforms were implemented with bad timing. In a situation that saw 
no improvement for the general public, these measures aggravated 
their uneasiness about the future, which led to a fall in consumption 
(rise in the propensity to save).
What was really problematic was the stance the Koizumi Cab-
inet took on the budget deficit. A rise in the consumption tax rate, the 
abolition of income tax credit and a reduction of budget expenditure 
put heavy deflationary pressure on the Japanese economy.9
The Izanami Boom ?The above account, however, hardly 
does justice to the effects on the Japanese economy sufficiently in 
the Koizumi Cabinet period, for the boom dubbed the Izanami con-
tinued.
The Izanami Boom was brought about mainly as a side effect 
of the zero interest rate policy implemented in March 2001 (which 
                                                          
9 The Structural Reformers have an allergic antagonism to fiscal policy, but 
they do not perceive that this can put deflationary pressure on the economy. 
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was maintained until July 2006). This policy gave rise to Yen Carry 
Trade on a huge scale. The US economy was beginning to recover, 
mainly in the housing market, from the 9.11 shock. It was American 
investors who showed an interest in the yen with zero interest rate. 
Borrowing yen and changing them into dollars in Japan, they used 
them to buy properties and financial assets in the US.
The Yen Carry Trade led to yen depreciation, so the Japanese 
exporting firms were able to make huge profits. The contribution ra-
tio of the exports to the economic growth in this period, in fact, 
reached almost 60%. Due to increased exports, capital investment 
rapidly increased as well.
And yet, the annual rate of economic growth in terms of GDP 
was relatively low (2%). This was greatly affected by stagnation in 
consumption due to a deterioration in labor conditions (including a 
large-scale shift from normal employment to temporary employment 
and little or no increase in wages) and widening income disparity. 
The general public chose a life style to save (not to consume). The 
sales of the retail trade including the department stores and the su-
permarkets continued their prolonged decline.
The Izanami Boom was largely dependent on exports, lacking 
in domestic effective demand. Although the exporting firms and the 
financial institutions made huge profits, a sort of social uneasiness 
spread again due to the restructuring, the predominance of temporary 
employment10 and little or no rise in wages. To the eyes of the gen-
eral public who could not enjoyed no benefits, the Izanami Boom 
was the Kagerou (Air Turbulence) Boom.
3.5. After the Lehman Shock
The Lehman Shock, which broke out in September 2008, 
caused the collapse of not only the US economy but also the rest of 
the world economy. Far from being an exception, Japan suffered se-
rious damage.
                                                          
10 The phrase “Working Poor” was coined.
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Japan, as already noted, experienced the financial system crisis 
in the latter half of the 90s. During the Izanami Boom, however, the 
bad debt problem could finally be settled, and the financial institu-
tions made unprecedentedly huge profits. Unlike the US and Europe-
an financial institutions, the Japanese financial institutes were not in-
volved in the financial bubble associated with securitized papers, for 
they were preoccupied with the bad debt problem. 
The root cause of the deterioration of the Japanese economy 
was a sharp drop in exports, which was caused by the crisis of the 
US real economy. Almost all the exporting firms (including the car 
industry and the electronic industry) racked up huge losses, followed 
by massive restructuring and stoppage of investment. Consumption, 
which had long remained stagnant, showed further decline. Thus the 
Japanese economy abruptly spiraled downward. The stock price 
sharply dropped as well. Then there broke out speculative buying of 
yen. As the Japanese government did not intervene in the foreign ex-
change market, the yen peaked (76 yen) in March 2011.
Facing these critical conditions, however, the Japanese gov-
ernment was too worried about the huge budget deficit to implement 
counter-cyclical economic measures. Far from it, the bashing of 
“public investment” became a motto. The main policy of the Demo-
cratic Party included Child Benefits, Agricultural Individual Income 
Compensation, and Free Senior High School Tuition, none of which 
had anything to do with counter-cyclical measures. The government 
did not intervene in the foreign exchange market, fearing internation-
al reaction. The only counter-cyclical measures implemented were 
the zero interest rate policy by the BOJ (October 2010; this was the 
third time) and the Quantity Easing policy. However, even if money 
finds its way to the financial institutions through the QE (by buying 
the national debt), the project cannot work well, because of the credit 
crunch and credit withdrawal by the financial institutions on the one 
hand, and the feeble credit demand by the firms on the other.
During this period consumption has remained stagnant. Due to 
a sharp increase in unemployment the general public is uneasy about 
the cost of living and trying to limit consumption and save money, so 
we have the saving paradox. In the case of the firms, they are en-
Globalization and Economic Crisis
92
 
deavoring to move their factories abroad because of yen apprecia-
tion, with the result that de-industrialization is under way. Thus in-
vestment remains low as well. Taking the stagnation in exports into 
account, all in all the aggregate effective demand is very low. Then 
Japan with its persisting deflationary situation has encountered the 
apocalypse of March 11, 2011 – the colossal Tsunami and the col-
lapse of the atomic power plants in Fukushima. 
4. Looking Back Over the Two Decades
4.1. Japan on the International Scene
Throughout the 80s the US economy suffered from serious 
stagflation. It was Japan and the West Germany that economically
led the world, and Japan was coming into incessant trade conflict 
with the US. Albeit militarily and politically weak, Japan was out-
standing in creating the highest quality manufactured goods through 
the endeavor of the firms (such as the Quality Control [QC) move-
ment, and innovative technology). Economically speaking, Japan 
was distinctly top-drawer.
With abundant money supply at its zenith, however, the Japa-
nese economy ran into the bubble, and property prices, stock prices 
and other asset prices shot up. Failure to tackle the bubble, the Japa-
nese economy was to experience the Lost Decade. Then, helped by 
the Yen Carry Trade, it was able to maintain the “Izanami (or 
Kagerou) Boom”. Hit by the Lehman Shock, however, it again 
plunged into bottomless depression. Now severe instability descend-
ed both on the firms enjoying high reputation for “Japanese-style 
Management”, and on the laborers and salaried men who were re-
garded with awe as the “corporate warriors”. 
The US saw liberalization (above all, financial liberalization) 
proceed on a large scale in the 80s. In this process the Shadow Bank-
ing System (SBS) was enlarged, and the US came to lead the world 
financially. This, together with the innovative IT industry, boosted 
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the US economy in the 90s. The people went in for consumption 
while the firms regained self-confidence.
Excessive financial liberalization was, however, to put a great 
strain on the US economy. The USA had reacted smugly to Japan’s 
Lost Decade, but ironically was now following the same path, to 
even worse effect, influencing the world economy.
In 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed, and a political situation 
emerged in which the US took on, also in military terms, overwhelm-
ing stature in the world. This, however, did not last long. The US 
was to be deeply involved in endless conflict in its “War on Terror-
ism”.
In the same period, a phenomenon arose which was to trans-
form both economy and politics in the world. China, Brazil and In-
dia, which had long been underdeveloped countries, continued to 
achieve surprisingly high economic growth. China, for instance, 
went on growing at an average of 8 % plus over the three decades, as 
a result of which it became No. 2 in terms of GDP, and No. 1 in 
terms of foreign currency reserves (2 trillion dollars). 
Thus the economic and political structure of the world dramat-
ically changed to such a degree that nobody had been able to foresee 
twenty years before. Today the presence of the Japanese economy in 
the world economy is manifestly in decline. While the Japanese 
economy remained stagnant, the US and the UK led the world in the 
financial area, and the BRICS and the Southeastern Asian countries 
raised their position in the area of the real economy.
Twenty years ago it was said that Tokyo was soon to become 
the world financial center together with New York and London. Now 
it’s a dim memory. Then the Japanese manufacturing industry was 
proud of its overwhelming productive efficiency, thanks to the intro-
duction of robots. Now it is lagging behind US industry in the IT ar-
ea. It is, moreover, feeling Korean and Chinese firms at its heels. On 
top of this, while Korea and China built up a strong backup system 
through their governments, the Japanese firms evidently lack such 
support.
The deterioration of the Japanese political system in recent 
years, and its weak position in the world politics are all too evident. 
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We can say, ironically enough, that there is no country like Japan for 
respect of the principle of laissez-faire. While the US, the UK, China 
and Russia move on the basis of their “national interests”, only Japan 
seems to leave everything to market fundamentalism. Restructuring 
of the Japanese political system is indispensable for the resurgence of 
Japan’s position in the world economy.
4.2. The Main Cause of the Lost Decade
There is an argument that the root cause of the Lost Decade 
should be seen in the line of cooperation with the US, starting with 
the Plaza Accord. The real responsibility, however, should be sought 
in the government’s failure to adjust policies to the changed condi-
tions.
The appreciation of the yen rapidly ran its course in accord-
ance with the Plaza Accord. Soon worries were spreading about the 
onset of depression. Then the government implemented an easy 
money policy (the low interest rate policy) and fiscal policy which 
included public works. Thanks to these measures, the Japanese econ-
omy, far from falling into depression, was able to maintain an up-
ward trend. So far, so good.
During the same period there was a great shift in the financial 
structure, from indirect to direct finance (and self-finance). Due to 
failure to adjust to this change, the Japanese economy boiled up to 
the bubble phase. Above all, without implementing tight monetary 
policy the government allowed the bubble to run its course.
A series of drastic decisions was then implemented tightening 
monetary policy, such as “the Regulation of the Total Sum concern-
ing the Property Loan”, in order to arrest this process. But the gov-
ernment allowed the deflationary process to proceed so long that the 
economy plunged into depression (The government should have lift-
ed its tight money policy earlier). Thus a series of asset deflation 
processes followed, starting with a sharp decline in the price of prop-
erty and stock prices. Then the Japanese economy saw the collapse 
of the financial system. It seemed self-trapped through the inappro-
priate timing of economic policy.
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These policy failures were further aggravated by the Structural 
Reformers’ inconsistent policy. They argued that the economy 
should be left to the workings of the market as much as possible, and 
should be made efficient through de-regulation. So far, so good. 
However, they had lost sight of macroeconomic policy so there was 
no scope for a rational economic policy11. The refusal to apply fiscal 
policy (abnormal reaction to public works) and the implementation 
of de facto of deflationary policies in the deflationary phase are em-
blematic examples .
4.3. Chaos and Lost Confidence
Turning to the domestic side, the Japanese people as a whole 
seemed to shift from impatience into loss of confidence. 
In the 90s Japan saw political whirlwinds. In addition, in re-
cent years governments changed within a short period. The Demo-
cratic Party, which assembled the cabinet in October 2009, did not 
implement any policy measures to tackle the economic crisis that hit 
Japan immediately after the Lehman Shock. The main measures (the 
above-mentioned Child Benefit, Agricultural Individual Income 
Compensation, and Free Tuition for Senior High School) did not aim 
at tackling the economic crisis. The Democratic Party’s governments 
have had no definite policy vision of how to manage the economy, 
consequently leaving it to the working of the market economy. Fiscal 
policy is regarded as a sort of taboo, while monetary policy (zero in-
terest rate) has no effect in terms of recovery of the stagnant econo-
my. The government seldom intervenes in the foreign exchange mar-
ket, allowing the yen to appreciate abruptly (to dollar). In these re-
spects the Japanese government is in sharp contrast with foreign 
governments (such as those of China, the US, Russia, and the EU) 
which set out to defend their national interests.
Consequently, even in the international economy theater Ja-
pan’s presence has dwindled. The State of the Union Address by 
President Obama in February 2011 was emblematic, for he very of-
ten referred to Korea and China without mentioning Japan. In the 
sphere of foreign policy, the presence of Japan was meaningless. In 
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the redeployment problem of the US military base in Okinawa, and 
the conflict of the Senkaku Islands, the government voluntarily 
abandoned responsibility, almost losing its raison d’être.
The firms – the driving forces of the Japanese economy - need 
to survive on their own in the world market, given the incompetence 
of the government. Japanese firms continue to be exposed to severe 
competition from the Korean and Chinese firms. Given the persistent 
shrinkage of the domestic market, they are forced to resort desperate-
ly to some global strategy. What is worrisome, as a consequence of 
many firms in the industries shifting their factories overseas, is the 
acceleration in de-industrialization.
The Japanese people seem to be losing self-confidence. Hav-
ing suffered from restructuring and a rapid increase in temporary 
employment during the long depression, they are, psychologically 
and economically, in the throes of unstable conditions. Thus even if 
the income from savings is almost nil, they have got accustomed to 
abstaining from consumption.
Reflecting this social atmosphere, the young tend to be intro-
versive. They like a quiet life, avoiding competition and showing in-
terest no in foreign countries. Yet there is no room for this introver-
sive attitude in today’s world. Even the Japanese firms which are try-
ing to achieve survival through global operations have a tendency not 
to employ more young Japanese.
Thus the Japanese economy is in a state of self-trap, finding no 
exit. 
5. Conclusion – New Social Philosophy Required
The Japanese economy is a market economy. Yet market (or 
private) economy at present lacks the ability to pull itself up by the 
bootstraps. Even if there are innovative entrepreneurs, the present fi-
nancial institutions lack the ability and will to provide themselves 
with the required capital. In Japan, unlike the US, venture capital 
market has not successfully arisen.
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Moreover, the direct finance of enterprises is completely 
blocked because of the stagnant stock market. The key to boost the 
market economy should be to form a government capable of imple-
menting shrewd and bold policies. After the private economy had 
been allowed to bubble, we saw it remaining stagnant. And then the 
government failed to come up with the necessary macroeconomic 
measures11
“The power of the private sector, the self-adjusting mechanism 
of the market, economic behavior based on self-responsibility” etc.: 
these mottos seem to lose color in the present Japanese economy. 
Entrepreneurs are not necessarily beings that can be completely en-
trusted with the future of the Japanese economy. What they are do-
ing at present is to reduce costs through restructuring. Although the 
firms might, by this means, improve the financial conditions to some 
degree, mass unemployment is emerging in return. It has become 
common practice for firms to reduce bonuses and lower wages, 
bringing further deflationary pressure to bear on the economy.
. This should not be repeated.
We suggest that both efficiency, by means of the market, and 
security, guaranteed by the government, should be required for the 
smooth working of the market economy. It is important for the eco-
nomic agents to feel some degree of stability. It is an obligation for 
the government to work out the institutional framework, because on-
ly within a stable framework can the people engage in competition
with self-confidence. Contrastingly, a society in which people are 
subject to uneasiness, seeing no future prospects, and dropping out as 
a result of competition, is not a good society. “Self-responsibility” 
has no meaning unless some degree of stability and safety is guaran-
teed. A jungle of business competition à la Hobbes is to be avoided. 
                                                          
11 This is a responsibility of macroeconomics as well. 
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